14 January 2026

Substantiating the Hard Way Doctrine

While my article, “The Easy Way or the Hard Way,” outlines the doctrinal framework behind the American ultimatum regarding Greenland, this brief provides the crucial intelligence-based validation for that doctrine. The purpose of this brief is to analyse the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s (DDIS) Intelligence Outlook 2025 to substantiate the specific Russian and Chinese threats that make Greenland a non-negotiable security imperative for the United States. While my previous analysis defines the doctrinal framework of American policy, the DDIS report provides the empirical foundation—the specific, actionable intelligence that fuels its urgency.

The American position is one of unambiguous resolve, defined by a direct ultimatum: “if we don’t do it the easy way, we’re going to do it the hard way.” This is not a negotiating tactic but a strategic conclusion derived from a clear threat perception. The core rationale, stripped of diplomatic pleasantries, is that

“Russia or China will take over Greenland, and we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbour.”

The detailed threats identified by the DDIS provide a stark justification for what has been termed a Washington’s “unsentimental statecraft” and its redefinition of sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere. Understanding the American doctrine is the first step; appreciating the gravity of the intelligence that validates it is the necessary second.

The Doctrinal Imperative

To understand America’s assertive posture on Greenland, one must first analyse the specific threats that have elevated the territory from a remote outpost to a central theatre in hemispheric defence. The DDIS Intelligence Outlook 2025 provides a clear, intelligence-backed assessment that mirrors and validates Washington’s perspective, framing the Arctic as a new and unavoidable arena of great power competition.

The DDIS report confirms that the era of low tension in the region is over. It states that Russia, China, and the United States have

“diverging interests in the Arctic, but all three countries seek to play a greater role in the region.”

This competition is no longer abstract; it “is increasingly playing out in the Arctic,” which is “no longer defined by the low level of tension that existed prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.” The report underscores the critical military-strategic significance of the region, noting that ballistic missiles from all three powers would “travel over the Arctic region in the event of a major conflict.” This transforms the Arctic from a geographic periphery into a central corridor for strategic deterrence and attack.

For the United States specifically, Greenland is an indispensable asset for homeland defence. The DDIS report identifies the “radars at Pituffik Space Base” as playing a “central role in detecting hostile missiles heading towards the US mainland.” This intelligence finding directly supports the early strategic analysis, which identifies the same base as a “critical node for satellite dominance.” Greenland is, therefore, not merely a piece of the North American continent but a lynchpin in the entire US early warning and space control architecture.

While the strategic value of Greenland is clear, it is the perceived inability of Denmark to adequately secure this critical asset against mounting threats that triggers the American doctrinal response outlined earlier.

The Sovereignty Calculus

I my article, I highlighted a fundamental American redefinition of sovereignty—that

“to be a sovereign power means to be able to provide for your own security.”

The central American argument is that when a country’s failure to secure its territory constitutes “chronic wrongdoing” that threatens hemispheric stability, intervention becomes justified. The DDIS intelligence assessment provides the granular evidence for this “chronic wrongdoing,” detailing a Russian hybrid campaign of a scale and sophistication that exposes the fundamental limits of Denmark’s deterrent capacity and, in Washington’s view, voids its sovereign legitimacy over a critical security asset.

The DDIS report details the comprehensive nature of Russia’s hybrid war, a multi-domain campaign designed to undermine NATO from within. Crucially, the DDIS concludes that Russia “is currently conducting a hybrid war against NATO and the West” and assesses that “Russia sees itself in conflict with NATO and is launching hybrid attacks against the Alliance, including sabotage and destructive cyber attacks.” According to Danish intelligence, Russia’s primary goal is to “weaken NATO’s political cohesion and decision-making capacity” by creating a “sustained state of uncertainty.”

This hybrid war directly targets the infrastructure vital to both Denmark and the broader Alliance. The DDIS assessment corroborates the strategic assumption that Russia is preparing the battlespace for a potential conflict, confirming that

“Russia is systematically mapping critical infrastructure in Denmark, including subsea infrastructure in and around the waters of the Kingdom of Denmark.”

The purpose of this activity is “to identify potential targets for sabotage or attacks on critical subsea infrastructure, such as power cables and internet cables, in case of an escalating conflict or war with NATO.” These preparations are not for mere disruption but to gain the capability to disrupt or disable vital transatlantic links.

The scale of Russia’s hybrid warfare and its preparations to target critical infrastructure present a level of threat that, from a US perspective, exceeds Denmark’s capacity to repel. This mismatch between threat and capability moves the discussion beyond hybrid warfare and necessitates a direct examination of the conventional military posture Russia and China are adopting on America’s northern flank.

A Two-Front Challenge in the Arctic

Let us now move beyond doctrine to present the core, intelligence-based evidence for the American position. The tangible actions by both Russia and China in the Arctic, as documented by the DDIS, create a two-front challenge that directly threatens Greenland and the North American continent, providing the factual predicate for Washington’s ultimatum.

Russia’s Confrontational Posture in the GIUK Gap

Russia’s military build-up and aggressive behaviour are most acute in the strategic corridor between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (the GIUK Gap). The DDIS describes this area as “the main maritime gateway to and from the Arctic” for the Russian navy, making it a critical chokepoint in any potential conflict.

The DDIS report details a systematic and comprehensive Russian campaign to dominate this space. Russia

“systematically monitors NATO activities and charts the waters of the GIUK Gap, employing a mix of military and civilian vessels... alongside other assets such as aircraft and satellites.”

The ultimate objective is unambiguous. In a conflict with NATO, Russia would aim to “disrupt the supply lines between the United States and Europe” and “restrict the freedom of movement of NATO surface vessels.” This posture directly threatens NATO’s foundational principle of transatlantic reinforcement and places Greenland at the epicentre of a potential naval confrontation.

China’s Strategic Encroachment

While Russia presents an immediate confrontational threat, China represents a longer-term strategic challenge that is fundamentally altering the security landscape of the Arctic. The DDIS assessment is clear:

“China’s military ambitions in the Arctic are closely tied to its strategic rivalry with the United States.”

Beijing’s objectives are patient, methodical, and profoundly consequential. It aims to “develop an independent capability to operate both surface ships and submarines in Arctic waters within five to ten years.” The ultimate strategic goal is to achieve nuclear parity with the superpowers, as “China’s long-term goal is to deploy missile submarines beneath the ice, thereby attaining the same nuclear second-strike capability as Russia and the United States.”

Crucially, this ambition is being dramatically accelerated by a deepening partnership with a weakened Russia. The DDIS notes that due to Western sanctions, Russia is in a “severely weakened negotiating position vis-à-vis China, forcing it to grant China greater influence and access in the Arctic.” This is not merely cooperation; it is a forced concession that allows China to leverage Russian expertise and access, drastically shortening its timeline for establishing a military presence on America’s northern flank and adding immense urgency to the American calculus.

These detailed intelligence findings—revealing both Russia’s immediate aggression and China’s long-term strategic ambition—provide the factual foundation for the seemingly drastic American policy toward Greenland.

The Irreversible Logic of Fortress America

The intelligence presented in the DDIS Intelligence Outlook 2025 serves as a powerful and direct validation of the strategic logic articulated in the text below. The specific, multi-faceted threats documented by Danish intelligence transform the American ultimatum regarding Greenland from what a casual observer might dismiss as a diplomatic whim into a calculated and necessary response to a clear and present danger.

It is the convergence of these threats—Russia’s immediate hybrid and conventional aggression acting as a disruptive vanguard, while China methodically builds a long-term strategic challenge—that renders the status quo untenable for Washington. This synergistic crisis creates a security environment that the United States is no longer willing to entrust to an ally it deems incapable of managing the challenge.

From the perspective of the Fortress America doctrine, the evidence of these escalating threats makes Danish sovereignty over Greenland a strategic liability the United States will no longer accept. This grim calculus renders the ultimatum—the “easy way or the hard way”—not merely a policy choice, but a strategic inevitability.

The Easy Way or the Hard Way: Greenland and the Consolidation of Fortress America

By Khaled Salih

11 January 2026

Since the publication of my analysis on the Greenland Ultimatum, a critical document has surfaced that transforms the American demand from a diplomatic provocation into a strategic inevitability. The newly released Intelligence Outlook 2025 by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) provides the smoking gun that validates the logic of the 2025 National Security Strategy.

No longer mere American conjecture, Copenhagen’s own spies now confirm the existential danger: China is actively seeking a nuclear second-strike capability beneath the Arctic ice, while Russia is utilising “civilian” trawlers to map the GIUK gap for future sabotage. Furthermore, the DDIS admits that the Kingdom is already being fractured by Russian influence operations designed to sever ties with Washington. This intelligence admission strips away the rhetorical protests of European leaders, revealing the cold logic of the Trump Corollary: if Denmark cannot secure the hemisphere against hybrid warfare, the United States will.

“I’m not talking about money for Greenland yet. I might talk about that. But right now, we are going to do something on Greenland, whether they like it not, because if we don’t do it, Russia or China will take over Greenland, and we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbour. I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way, we’re going to do it the hard way.”

—President Trump, 10 January 2026 [emphasis added]

The United States’ intensifying focus on Greenland is not an isolated diplomatic whim but the logical and tangible next step in the enforcement of its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). Moving decisively from theory to territorial consolidation, the administration has presented the ultimatum to Denmark as the ultimate expression of this new doctrine. The credibility of this approach was recently established through the “kinetic proof” of the military intervention in Venezuela, an operation President Trump described with exultant detachment: “I watched it literally like I was watching a television show.” This unsentimental application of power is the centrepiece of a new foreign policy architecture, one explicitly codified in the 2025 NSS, which asserts and enforces what has been identified as a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The Greenland gambit, therefore, serves as the formal announcement that the theoretical framework of Fortress America is now being implemented through direct territorial claim, backed by credible and demonstrated force.

The Doctrinal Imperative

To understand the strategic logic behind the Greenland gambit, one must first grasp its foundational role within the 2025 National Security Strategy. Within this framework, hemispheric security is the paramount concern, and control of the Arctic—America’s northern gateway—has been elevated to a non-negotiable imperative. Washington views the island not merely as valuable real estate but as a strategic lynchpin against the encroachment of great power rivals and a bulwark for the integrity of the homeland.

This doctrine is animated by an explicit allusion to America’s past. The Trump Corollary is a direct and intentional echo of Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted the United States’ right to intervene in cases of “chronic wrongdoing” and effectively declared the entire Western Hemisphere a U.S. sphere of dominance. This is a deliberate rejection of post-Cold War multilateralism in favor of a Gilded Age model of unilateral power projection. The geographical basis for applying this doctrine to Greenland is unambiguous: the island is part of the North American continent and, therefore, squarely within the Western Hemisphere. This geographic fact provides the administration with the rationale to dictate regional security and explicitly exclude rivals like Russia and China from gaining a strategic foothold.

The urgency of this exclusion is validated by the adversaries’ own behaviour. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service has charted a systematic Russian campaign to map the GIUK Gap—the maritime gateway between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK—using civilian fishing trawlers and research vessels as proxies for military surveillance. Their objective is clear: to refine operational plans for severing transatlantic supply lines and sabotaging critical subsea infrastructure,. In this context, the administration views the ‘civilian’ presence of rival powers in Greenlandic waters not as benign commerce, but as the preparatory phase of a hybrid war.

The urgency is fuelled by a new geopolitical context. The melting of Arctic ice has unveiled vast deposits of rare earth minerals and opened strategic new shipping routes, transforming Greenland from a Cold War outpost into a prize in a new era of global rivalry. This shift is compounded by the island’s growing importance in the 21st-century space race, with the Púfįk Space Base now identified as a critical node for satellite dominance. For Washington, this confluence of economic and high-technology stakes makes passive reliance on old agreements an unacceptable risk. This view is not new, but rather the modern culmination of a long-standing American security interest, following previous attempts to purchase the island in 1867 and 1946. This enduring strategic interest is now being pursued with a signature bluntness, an ultimatum that has become the administration’s primary tool of statecraft.

Crucially, the threat is no longer merely commercial or logistical, but existential. Danish intelligence now confirms that China is actively developing the capability to operate ballistic missile submarines beneath the Arctic ice cap, seeking a chilling “second-strike capability” comparable to that of Russia and the United States. This transforms the region into a potential nuclear hideout, a reality underscored by the sighting of Chinese icebreakers conducting joint patrols with Russia north of the Bering Strait in 2024 and 2025,. For Washington, the defence of the Pituffik Space Base is not just about satellite dominance, but about denying Beijing a submerged nuclear launchpad on America’s northern threshold.

A Pattern of Unsentimental Statecraft

The “easy way or the hard way” ultimatum delivered to Denmark is not mere rhetoric; it is a calculated and repeatable doctrinal tool designed to bypass protracted negotiation and compel outcomes favourable to U.S. interests. This language reveals a consistent pattern of statecraft that presents its targets with a stark, binary choice: capitulation or coercion. Its use in other geopolitical theatres demonstrates a clear playbook for dealing with actors deemed obstacles to American strategic objectives.

A direct parallel is found in the language used regarding the disarmament of Hamas, which President Trump declared would occur “one way or another—the easy way or the hard way.” This recurring phraseology is a deliberate negotiating tactic. As analyst Pippa Malmgren observes, such language acts as

“the grenade... designed to get everybody off balance,”

seizing control of the diplomatic landscape by introducing chaos and uncertainty from the outset. The credibility of this ultimatum is anchored in the kinetic proof of the recent military operation in Venezuela. That swift intervention serves as the modern reassertion of Teddy Roosevelt’s “big stick” policy, confirming that while the current president “may not speak softly, ... he sure carries Teddy Roosevelt’s big stick.” This demonstrated willingness to use force transforms the ultimatum from a rhetorical threat into a believable statement of intent. This ultimatum, now backed by credible military action, serves as an instrument to shatter antiquated, legalistic notions of sovereignty.

Sovereignty: A Question of Power, Not Precedent

The Greenland gambit forces a direct confrontation between traditional, rules-based interpretations of national sovereignty and the administration’s realist doctrine. This redefinition of sovereignty is not a new invention, but a direct revival of the 19th-century “big stick” ethos where might is the primary determinant of sovereign legitimacy. This clash of doctrines is deliberate, designed to clear the ideological decks and dismantle legal obstacles to the consolidation of Fortress America.

Denmark’s position, grounded in established international norms, rests on three pillars. Legal Foundation: The 1916 agreement in which the United States explicitly recognised full Danish sovereignty over Greenland. Strategic Reality: A candid admission that Denmark cannot defend Greenland alone and relies on its allies for security. Constitutional Path: An acknowledgment that Greenland has a right to secede, though this path carries a “very very serious economic downside.”

The American rebuttal dismisses these claims as obsolete. This obsolescence is not theoretical; it is a documented intelligence failure. Copenhagen’s own assessments reveal that early 2025 saw a sophisticated Russian influence operation specifically designed to ‘exploit public debate over the relationship between Denmark and Greenland’ to fracture the Kingdom’s ties with the United States. If the Danish state cannot secure its own cognitive territory against Russian hybrid warfare, Washington argues, it holds no credible claim to securing the physical territory of the North American continent. Historical precedent is brushed aside as irrelevant, with President Trump stating,

“That fact that they had a boat land there 500 years ago, doesn’t mean that they own the land.”

The administration’s core argument redefines sovereignty itself, asserting that “to be a sovereign power means to be able to provide for your own security.” By this logic, Denmark’s admission that it cannot secure Greenland renders its claim void. Finally, existing lease agreements are deemed insufficient; absolute control is the goal. As the President articulated, “When we own it, we defend it.”

This redefinition of sovereignty is viewed by rivals as a profound violation of international norms. In response to the U.S. intervention in Venezuela—a precursor to the Greenland gambit—China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the operation as a “hegemonic act” that “seriously violate[d] international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty.” This direct condemnation from a peer competitor highlights the high stakes of the administration’s doctrine and its potential to accelerate geopolitical friction. This realist redefinition of sovereignty is being executed with a ruthless efficiency rooted not in modern theory, but in the timeless principles of ancient strategy.

The Art of the Un-War

Stripped of its contemporary rhetoric, the administration’s strategy is a modern application of Sun Tzu’s ancient wisdom, prioritizing total victory with minimal expenditure of blood and treasure. In an era of fiscal constraint and aversion to “forever wars,” this approach is a strategic necessity. The offer of the “easy way” is a direct reflection of Sun Tzu’s highest principle:

“To overcome others’ armies without fighting is the best of skills.”

It is an attempt to achieve a decisive geopolitical victory through leverage, not conflict. The corresponding threat of the “hard way” aligns with Sun Tzu’s philosophy of applying overwhelming psychological pressure to avoid a protracted campaign that would drain national resources, warning that “an army is like fire—if you don’t put it out, it will burn itself out.” The ultimatum is designed to force a swift outcome.

Furthermore, the administration’s often unpredictable style mirrors the inscrutable general described in the classic text: “Be extremely subtle... Be extremely mysterious... Thereby you can be the director of the opponent’s fate.” By keeping its methods ambiguous, the administration forces its opponents to react to a contest whose rules they do not fully comprehend. This application of timeless strategy to modern great-power rivalry is not occurring in a historical vacuum. As historian Niall Ferguson argues, the current U.S.-China dynamic is a chilling echo of the Anglo-German antagonism that preceded World War I. In this analogy, the United States is the “weary Titan,” akin to the Edwardian British Empire, while China is the ascendant challenger seeking its “place in the sun,” much like Wilhelmine Germany. The application of this ancient strategy to a modern great-power competition confirms more than a tactical choice; it signals the arrival of a new and irreversible reality for the Western Hemisphere.

An Irreversible Claim on the Hemisphere

The Greenland gambit is the ultimate validation of an “irreversible shift” in American foreign policy, marking the definitive evolution of the 2025 National Security Strategy from threat removal to the permanent consolidation of Fortress America. This singular move weaves together the doctrine’s core themes: the reassertion of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the Gilded Age revival of “big stick” diplomacy, and a realist redefinition of sovereignty that is now being actively challenged on the world stage by rivals like China. The ultimatum to Denmark serves as a message to both allies and rivals: America’s geopolitical framework has fundamentally shifted from global security guarantor to hemispheric sovereign. It is a supreme irony that the age of artificial intelligence may be trapping global politics in a 19th-century doom loop. As historical parallels with pre-war Europe become increasingly sharp, the chilling culmination of this new era is that the central foreign policy question of our time has become, as Ferguson cautions, “when, not if, World War III begins.”