The New York Declaration’s obvious design: A road to two Arab states

By Khaled Salih

The endorsement of the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution by the UN General Assembly is presented as a “tangible, time-bound, and irreversible” path toward two states. Approved by 142 countries, despite opposition from Israel and the United States, it condemns attacks by both Hamas and Israel in Gaza and calls for Hamas to disarm. However, a careful reading reveals a not-so-hidden design: this Declaration deliberately paves the way for “two Arab states” rather than a genuine two-state solution for two peoples. Far from being a blueprint for peace, it is, as Israel’s UN ambassador Danny Danon warned, “another hollow gesture that weakens this Assembly’s credibility.”

The core of the design lies not in its condemnations, but in paragraph 39, which states:

“[W]e decided to explore, in the context of the realisation of a sovereign Palestinian State, a regional security architecture that could provide security guarantees for all, building on the experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), paving the way for a more stable and secure Middle East, as well as a regional and international framework offering appropriate support to resolving the refugee question, while reiterating the right of return.” [emphasis added]

In plain terms, it reaffirms the demand that millions of Palestinians who fled in 1948 and their descendants be allowed to resettle inside Israel.

This demand is inseparable from the larger negotiations. For Palestinian leaders, and now 142 states supporting this declaration, the mechanism is to solidify two Arab states: one in the West Bank and Gaza without Jews, and another replacing Israel. The demographic implications are stark: with between five and nine million claimants to the right of return, Israel’s seven-million Jewish population would be absorbed into an Arab majority. This dynamic was recognized as early as 1947 by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who observed that “the Jews want a state in the land, and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state in the land.”

This unwavering priority has repeatedly derailed all previous peace proposals. Yasser Arafat walked away from generous offers at Camp David in 2000 partly because they did not meet his demands on return. In 2008, Mahmoud Abbas told U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice he could not accept a limit of a few thousand returnees. Internal Palestinian memos leaked in 2011 even warned negotiators that using the phrase “two states for two peoples” could be construed as forfeiting the right of return. These episodes suggest that the insistence on return is not tactical but fundamental, long-term, non-negotiable principle.

Despite this history, diplomats in Europe and North America often treat the right of return as symbolic or negotiable. Einat Wilf and Adi Schwartz have called this “western indulgence,” arguing that it misreads Palestinian intentions and underestimates the significance of a demand that would end Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. This principle explains why the Declaration’s drafters felt comfortable reaffirming the right of return alongside calls to disarm Hamas.

Unsurprisingly, Israeli and U.S. officials condemned the resolution for precisely this reason. Ahead of the vote, Ambassador Danon warned it “will not be remembered as a step toward peace.” After the vote, the U.S. delegation issued an explanation stating that the resolution was “a gift to Hamas,” arguing that reaffirming the right of return would mean “the demographic death of Israel as a Jewish state.” U.S. diplomat Morgan Ortagus added that the measure “undermines serious diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.”

Supporters of the declaration point to clauses demanding Hamas disarm, calling for hostages to be released, and for Gaza and the West Bank to be unified under the Palestinian Authority. Yet, by entrenching the right of return, the Declaration merges two goals that cannot coexist: the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and the mass resettlement of Palestinians inside Israel.

The enduring Israeli–Palestinian conflict has always been about more than borders. As Bevin’s 1947 observation suggests, it hinges on whether both peoples accept each other’s right to national self-determination. Declarations that endorse an unlimited right of return may satisfy Palestinian maximalists, but they do nothing to encourage coexistence, let alone peace or lasting peace. In fact, they signal to groups like Hamas that 142 states now not only remain sympathetic to the idea of dismantling Israel through demographic means, but reward their attempts on 7 October 2023. If there is to be progress toward a sustainable peace, it will require both sides to compromise on deeply held aspirations. For Israel, that means reiterating the inevitability of a sovereign Palestinian state (which has done so since 1947). For Palestinians, it means acknowledging that millions of descendants of 1948 refugees will not resettle inside Israel. Until the latter point is addressed, international initiatives like the New York Declaration risk perpetuating the very zero-sum logic they seek to overcome.

Sources:

Andrew Fox, 20250912, “Israel Derangement Syndrome,” https://substack.com/home/post/p-173420838?source=queue

Khaled Salih, 20250910, “Palestinianism: An Ideology of Annihilation,” https://substack.com/@danielclarkeserret/p-172655976

UN, 202500804, “New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” A/CONF.243/2025/1, https://docs.un.org/en/A/CONF.243/2025/1

UN, 20250912, “General Assembly Endorses New York Declaration, Charting Path to Palestinian Statehood,” GA/12707, https://press.un.org/en/2025/ga12707.doc.htm

UN, 20250910, “Endorsement of the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” A/80/L.1/Rev.1, https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/L.1/Rev.1

Einat Wilf, 20250912, https://x.com/einatwilf/status/1966922627739443612?s=43